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Abstract 
This evidence review considers future security of travel by public transport and addresses three 
questions: (1) What are the current security challenges for public transport networks? (2) What 
are the emerging future security challenges? (3) What technologies will have the biggest impact 
on security of public transport in the future? The review identified current personal and 
operational security challenges associated with: convenience and privacy; interoperability and 
communication; risks and benefits of increasing connectivity; and skills requirements for the 
public transport sector.  
Important emerging security challenges relate to: user and service provider security in a future 
of data-driven mobility; design and evaluation of security measures for all modes; knowledge-
exchange and coordination in research and action to enhance security; and the need to better 
understand passenger behaviour, needs and attitudes in relation to travel, technology and 
security. The biggest impact technologies were identified as Vehicle (Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles; Connected and Autonomous Vehicles and Electric Vehicles) and ICT (Internet of 
Things; social media; mobile platforms; Open Data, and Big Data). In relation to ICTs, impacts 
relate to connectivity and data sharing which represent both vulnerabilities and strengths. For 
vehicle technologies, automation and connectivity were the factors most influencing impact for 
good or ill. 
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Introduction 
Security is important for public transport because it has the potential to influence travel 
behaviour at every stage of a journey from pre-trip planning, through undertaking the journey, 
to post-trip evaluation. In the UK context, it has been estimated that reducing fear of crime 
could increase public transport patronage by 3% at peak and 10% at off peak times (Newton 
2004). There are a significant challenges in measuring crime and disorder on public transport, 
that make it difficult to determine whether a gap exists between the ‘perceived’ and ‘actual’ 
levels of crime (Newton 2004). This is a consequence of limitations of data collected on actual 
levels of crime on public transport. The degree to which under-reporting of public transport 
crime is an important factor is also unclear. It has been suggested that, reported crime is 25 to 
30 times below the actual level of public transport crime (Levine and Wachs 1986 cited in 
Newton 2004). Alongside these concerns over data reliability and availability there is 
considerable volatility in public transport crime statistics, which relates to wider social trends. 
For example, the British Transport Police in 2018 reported significant rises in crimes 
committed on the railways compared to the previous year in relation to all crime (17%), 
violence against the person (26%), sexual offences (16%) and criminal damage (21%) (British 
Transport Police 2018).      
Transport security is a multi-faceted concept, which can be subject to a range of interpretations. 
For the purpose of this review, the domain of transport security will be defined and this will 
form part of the determination of the scope of the review alongside the research questions. 
Security is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘freedom from danger or threat; the 
state or condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; safety.” (OED Online 
2017). The reference to safety is significant. Safety and security have traditionally been 
bundled together in the transport sector. There are undoubtedly strong synergies between 
transport security and safety. Beecroft and Pangbourne provide a conceptual framework for the 
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definition of personal security which identifies confidence, safety and security as the three key 
aspects which overlap and intertwine in defining personal security: “By combining these 
perspectives that participants implicitly or explicitly attached to personal security in relation 
to travel, we reach our definition, that personal security is an objective freedom from security 
and safety risks combined with a subjective freedom from fear and uncertainty.” (Beecroft and 
Pangbourne 2015a). Equally, the increasing focus on resilience as a conceptual approach has 
led to the common consideration of security and safety concerns when assessing vulnerabilities 
to external threats of transport systems, services and infrastructures (Reggiani 2013; EC 2017). 
Accepting these synergies, it is necessary to establish some distinctions between 
security and safety for the review to be appropriately focused. Security issues can be separated 
from safety on the basis of intent (criminal or anti-social) and that they are exclusively man-
made (Holtrop and Kretz 2008 cited in Reniers and Amyotte 2012).  
This review recognises that security is an issue that operates at a range of spatial scales 
from the global to the household and individual level and every point in between. Indeed 
different spatial scales can be engaged in the course of a single door-to-door journey. It 
incorporates everything from personal security from crime and anti-social behaviour to national 
security in relation to terrorism (conventional warfare/military operations are considered out 
of scope of this review). The challenges faced at the range of scales covered by public transport 
security are extensive and their nature varies significantly at different scales. There may be 
solutions to security challenges at one scale that generate new challenges or exacerbate existing 
security challenges at other scales i.e. the priorities of national security and individual personal 
security may be quite different.  
When considering the notion of public transport security it is important to appreciate 
what we are trying to keep secure. This can range from the individual and their property to 
public transport systems, services and infrastructures. When determining property we must 
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consider both physical and virtual/digital property in the context of a world where there is ever-
increasing convergence between the digital and physical experience and our digital and 
physical identities (TSC 2016). A final point of definition required is the distinction between 
current and emerging security challenges which pertains to research questions 1 and 2. In this 
review, current challenges are identified by research evidence that has been and is currently 
being undertaken. Emerging challenges are determined by evidence which identifies future 
issues for research and associated trends. 
 
Methodology 
This evidence review was completed in 2018 and was undertaken using systematic evidence 
review principles. The review combines the interrogation of academic and policy literature 
(both official and “grey” materials). The success of this review was partly dependent on the 
ability of the Investigator to identify key words and their variants which would lead to an 
efficient and effective search of material in relation to the three research questions. 
In order to assess security challenges for public transport networks it is necessary to 
construct/adopt a typology for analysis. This review adopts the typology provided by the 
European Commission in its Research Theme Analysis Report on Transport Security (EC 
2017). This typology is appropriate given that it has been applied to review the transport 
security research landscape in the most relevant, systematic and comprehensive manner 
currently available. This report reviewed European Union supported transport security related 
research, research financed nationally in the European Research Area Network and selected 
Global research programmes. It reviewed completed and ongoing projects since 2001. The 
typology is expressed in the form of a set of six transport security themes as follows: 
1. Threat detection and prevention 
2. Crisis management 
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3. Cyber security, privacy and ICT 
4. Staff security training 
5. Cargo security 
6. Passenger security 
The fifth theme, Cargo security was not adopted for the review given its exclusive focus 
on public (passenger) transport. The adoption of this typology does not imply an endorsement 
of the overarching strategy towards transport security, as Hoijtink (2015) states:  
“European security research as a whole is performed in such a way that it becomes 
difficult to contest. In particular, the Seventh Framework Programme’s twin rationale – 
enhancing the security of Europe’s citizens, while enlarging the European market for civil 
security – is so dominant that it renders questions about its use, desirability and effectiveness 
obsolete. What kind of security are we investing in and against which costs? And, most 
importantly, what kind of security do we want, and for whom? These questions are not raised, 
but they have become ever more relevant now that the EU has intensified its investment in 
security research with the launch of the Horizon2020 project.”  
Discussion under these themes includes coverage of security issues across modes 
including transition points (such as interchanges) for passenger transport. Whilst findings from 
EC research are the starting point for evidence review in each theme, this evidence base is 
extended to provide a broader geographical coverage (particularly through research evidence 
from North America and Australasia).  
 
Findings (1): What are the current security challenges for public transport 
networks?  
 
Threat detection and prevention 
The EC reviewed 78 research projects on this theme. In terms of scope, it is notable that projects 
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in the field of risk assessment and management have benefitted from fairly continuous research 
over the years as it requires constant revision/review in the light of changing vulnerabilities 
and threats. The introduction of ‘Efficiency’ as a research theme from 2009 and its continued 
emphasis is a recognition of a significant current challenge: to make threat detection and 
prevention more efficient and less disturbing to traffic flow, particularly in relation to 
passengers (EC 2017). Further research by Carter et al (2016) found that airport style screening 
was the least acceptable of a set of 10 proposed public transport security measures. It is 
particularly notable that research funding in the transport security field has typically been 
reactive rather than proactive. Research (and associated funding) has tended to respond to 
threats/events rather than seeking to anticipate them (EC 2017). This is a clear weakness and 
is unlikely to be confined to the European context. 
The EC review of projects reveals that research in this field has tended to be focussed 
on aviation, but it is increasingly focussing on other modes (See also Cavallini et al 2014 for a 
discussion of the comparative lack of detailed security legislation in land-based transport when 
compared with aviation). Research has long focussed on monitoring and surveillance systems 
for aircraft, airports, passengers and luggage. An important identified challenge is how and 
when to transfer innovations in monitoring and surveillance from the air transport sector to 
other transport sectors, particularly as they are likely to impact significantly upon efficiency 
(EC 2017, see also Patil et al 2014).  
Research in the road transport sector has largely focussed upon systems for unattended 
surveillance of public transport and on technologies and methods to better design stations and 
terminals to reduce the impact of security incidents. It is notable that in most recent years the 
protection of ‘Critical Infrastructure’ has been identified as a key challenge, reflecting “the 
need for a holistic approach, integrating functionalities at all critical infrastructure levels (i.e. 
individual, across interdependent critical infrastructure and across borders).” (EC 2017, see 
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also Zamparini and Shiftan 2013; Reggiani 2013 and Cavallini et al 2014). This challenge has 
also been recognised in the United States by Szyliowicz (2013) who stated that the lack of an 
updated national policy to resolve the serious weaknesses of critical transportation 
infrastructure negatively impacts security. 
 
Crisis management 
The EC reviewed 31 projects on this theme. Research has tended to focus more upon 
organisation of crisis and emergency management (including recovery and resilience planning) 
rather than technological considerations. The key challenge in this regard is the intelligent 
linking of information sources and stakeholders and related issues of interoperability of 
procedures and technologies. This points to the need for cooperative working practices across 
borders (modal/spatial/governmental) to ensure effective collaboration and minimise the 
consequences of security-based emergencies. It also points to an identified future challenge in 
terms of the technologies needed to intelligently and securely link information (EC 2017). 
Beecroft and Pangbourne (2015a) noted that both resilience planning and crisis management 
were important current challenges and effective solutions were dependent on improvements in 
collaborative working and information sharing across the transport sector. 
 
 
Cyber security, privacy and information and communications technology (ICT) 
The EC reviewed 28 projects on this theme. Half of these projects have commenced in the last 
five years, reflecting the growing recognition of the fundamental and ever-increasing role that 
ICT plays in our transport systems, services and infrastructures (EC 2017, see also Cavallini et 
al 2014). Research in this theme was intitially predominatly in the aviation sector , but is 
increasingly spread to the road and rail sectors. Key focus areas include secure vehicle-to-
everything (V2X) communication and associated privacy and security concerns (EC 2017, see 
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also Azees et al 2016). When considered as a multi-modal issue within the context of smart 
cities, securing V2X communication is a significant challenge and cryptographic solutions are 
a focus for current research (Javed et al 2016).  
Securing transport networks and infrastructures from cyber-threats is an increasing 
issue of research focus. Infrastructure and network control equipment is typically old legacy 
software and hardware whilst securing our critical infrastructure increasingly relies upon the 
newest interconnected ICT technologies and this raises significant integration challenges. (EC 
2017). Personal identity protection and broader data protection are key issues for transport 
security. The Norwegian Data Protection and Privacy Implication in Road Safety project 
revealed survey respondents concerns about being exposed to misuse of personal data were 
greater than for terror attacks (EC 2017).  
The UK Transport Systems Catapult (TSC 2016) undertook an evidence review 
combined with interviews and workshops with over seventy experts on cyber security and 
intelligent mobility (IM)1 The review encompassed current practice and future priorities. In 
relation to current practice it found: 
“All sectors of mobility realise that cyber security is a significant issue affecting 
operations and services. But this understanding is still not equivalent to the scale of the issue 
at hand. New cyber security strategies will be accelerated regardless of the conditions of the 
intelligent mobility market. But their impacts will be greatest where effective strategy to 
accelerate these technologies into intelligent mobility exist, and where industry culture enables 
it to do so.” (TSC 2016) 
IM and its key domains of automation, new mobility models (particularly Mobility as 
a Service or MaaS) and smart ecosystems are particulalrly dependent upon complex and 
                                                          
1 A concept which sees emerging technologies enabling smarter, greener and more efficient movement 
of people and goods (TSC 2016). 
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interconnected data networks that work across sectors and services making cyber security a 
key consideration (TSC 2016). The key current challenges identified by the TSC are: the 
establishment of principles for securing IM; development of technology and research roadmaps 
for securing IM; and upskilling the mobility sector workforce in cyber security (TSC 2016). In 
relation to automation, Petit and Shladover (2015) have explored potential cyber-attacks in 
relation to connected and autonomous vehicles.They identified GNSS spoofing and injection 
of fake messages as the most dangerous attacks in terms of both likelihood and severity.  
 
Staff security training 
The EC reviewed 28 projects on this theme. Significant challenges identified in this area 
include inconsistencies in skills education and training at varying scales: across countries and 
even between companies in the same regions. There are many examples of good practice in 
training, but transferability is inconsistent. At its worst, deficiencies in training have led to 
significant skills gaps and these can be exacerbated by increasing dependence on technologies 
to deliver staff training and to assist staff in customer service and problem resolution. Provision 
of training to handle complex situations can be difficult and an increasing need to understand 
and predict social behaviour under stressful emergencies has been identified as an important 
need in across transport modes. Again, aviation tends to lead the way and there is a need to 
address transferability challenges in incorporating best practice from that sector to other modes 
(EC 2017).  
 
Passenger security 
The EC reviewed 23 projects on this theme. Policy and research requirements have usually 
been developed in response to specific incidents rather than in a proactive manner and this is 
identified as a weakness (EC 2017). The predominant focus of research in land-based modes 
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has been upon mass public transport, especially in urban areas (EC 2017). Demographic trends 
towards urbanisation combined with the increasing frequency and severity of terrorist incidents 
in these environments suggest this focus will need to intensify (Holgersson and Bjornstig 
2014). Here, a major issue is the difficulty of implementing security measures whilst 
maintaining passenger flows through the network, particularly at large interchanges. This 
relates both to issues of threat detection (monitoring and surveillance), but also to responding 
to crises and providing effective information and support. Learning from aviation is again 
important here and also in relation to developing blast resistant materials for use in trains and 
metro carriages. The two main security challenges identified for land transport are “avoiding 
interruptions to transport networks as a result of terrorist attacks and ensuring that transport 
does not become a means for an attack.” (EC 2017).  
 
Findings (2): What are the emerging security challenges, looking out to 2040? 
 
Threat detection and prevention 
The EC identified that the public transport sector has previously paid limited attention to the 
detection and prevention of threats and associated system vulnerabilities compared to other 
modes (specifically aviation and maritime). This needs to change in the light of the growing 
scale of the threat (EC 2017). Learning from aviation in this regard represents both an 
opportunity and a challenge for reasons already outlined. However, Cole and Kuhlmann (2011) 
have argued that even in aviation a proactive approach (based on anticipatory scenario 
planning) is needed to identify future threats and their coverage by airport security processes 
and technologies.  
Developing a more universal and collaborative approach to threat detection and 
prevention is a critical issue going forward in the context of increasing connected transport 
networks, services and infrastructures (EC 2017). Cross-border co-operation will be integral in 
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this area and the uncertainty of arrangements post-Brexit clearly represents a significant 
challenge in the short to medium term in the European context.  
 
Crisis management 
An important emerging challenge in this theme identified by the EC was to maximise the 
exploitation of big-data applications to support crisis management in terms of gathering 
intelligence on emerging situations and then distributing that information effectively to 
stakeholders. Cross-sector research was also called for in relation to cascade effects to 
minimise risks to crisis management i.e. social media constitutes a core means of 
communication, but mobile networks can be subject to overload and even to potential misuse 
both deliberate and unintentional (EC 2017).  
Steenbruggen et al (2013) investigated the use of data obtained from cellular-phone 
networks in supporting incident management, with particular attention to transport safety and 
security. They found that the use of telecom data has great potential to provide new types of 
information services. This could help to create an accurate understandable picture of reality to 
improve situational awareness. However, issues of timeliness, trust and provenance were 
significant emerging challenges.  
 
Cyber security, privacy and information and communications technology (ICT) 
The EC has identified intensive collaboration between different stakeholders in cyber security, 
privacy and ICT as the fundamental emerging challenge in this theme. More specifically the 
following emerging challenges have been identified:  
“the phenomena of the Internet of Things and cloud computing represents potential 
sources of near-future threats, as huge financial investments and human resources 
are now being committed. Their impacts on data mining, the reliability of 
information, the ability to deliver in-time discovery and response capabilities, and 
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privacy protection should be priorities for future European research and 
development activities.” (EC 2017).  
 
The TSC (2016) has identified that the rapidly changing security and mobility 
landscape will mean significant growth in the number, frequency and severity of cyber-attacks 
in the transport domain. This will be a consequence in part of increasing connectivity via the 
Internet of Things (see Lanza et al 2015) and the fact that this connectivity will involve physical 
functions such as controlling vehicles and infrastructure. Key emerging challenges are 
identified as ensuring transparency, knowledge-exchange and coordination in research and 
action across mobility sectors, unimodal approaches represent a threat to security overall. 
Given that IM is data driven, data security represent an important emerging challenge in 
relation to: privacy of customers and companies; the security of Open Data; evolving legal 
requirements for personal data protection and commercial incentives to ensure protection of 
personal data (TSC 2016).  
Understanding traveller attitudes to trade-offs between privacy and freedom on the one 
hand and security on the other has been an increasing focus of research in recent years (see 
McCarthy et al 2016a and 2016b; Patil et al 2014). However, the evidence base is limited at 
this stage. Developing knowledge in this area, including an appreciation of the diversity of 
perspectives and an associated population segmentation analysis (building on cluster analysis 
work by McCarthy et al 2016a and 2016b) represents an important challenge/opportunity in 
this research field. 
 
Staff security training 
Staff training and public awareness raising in relation to crisis management have been 
identified as important future challenges (EC 2017; Beecroft and Pangbourne 2015a). This 
relates to a wider challenge regarding the need to provide staff training which reflects changes 
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in wider society to meet the requirements of changes in both demographic structure 
(particularly ageing societies, increasing urbanisation deriving in part from international 
migration and its associated ethnic and cultural diversity) and social behaviour. This also 
relates to the issue of how to best communicate security messages to passengers and develop a 
society-wide security culture (EC 2017). Developing such a culture represents a significant 
challenge going forward. Hoijtink (2015) investigated efforts to establish a common security 
culture in mass transportation and found that the culture was not stable and was difficult to 
enact due to “the uneasy drawing together of transport operations and security objectives, 
terrorism and graffiti, and military and civil logics of security.” A further concern in this regard 
was identified by Carter et al (2016) that a culture of paranoia might be engendered and that 
passive forms of surveillance through sensor technology and video analytics were a preferable 
approach. The better utilisation of technology in training e.g. simulations, gaming and mobile 
apps was another identified challenge in this theme (EC 2017). 
 
Passenger Security 
A key emerging challenge in this theme is to apply the systematic approaches to design and 
evaluation of security measures common in aviation to all passenger modes. This relates 
particularly to threat detection and prevention and is inherently linked to developing scanning 
technologies and the collection and utilisation of passenger information: “research is needed 
into how this information might be linked to other information, such as that available on social 
media, to potentially differentiate the security approach taken for different passengers.” (EC 
2017). Linked to information concerns, Beecroft and Pangbourne (2015b) in the UK have 
identified concerns regarding the degree to which passenger information systems and services 
account for the personal security concerns of passengers. These relate particularly to the 
dynamic nature of personal security concerns associated with the impacts of journey disruption 
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as well as temporal factors (see also Ceccato and Uittenbogaard 2014) and the differing 
requirements and perceptions of different travellers (e.g. gender, age, language, etc.). For 
example, a review of international research evidence on harassment on public transport and its 
impacts on women’s travel behaviour by Gardner et al (2017) concluded that: 
• Sexual harassment on public transport appears to be a growing issue, but understanding 
is frustrated by a lack of data and under-reporting; 
• Harassment reinforces fear of crime, which limits womens mobility and reduces their 
use of public transport; 
• Significant proportions of young women believe that it is unsafe to use public transport 
at night; 
• Environmental interventions such as CCTV and lighting appear to have limited impacts 
on reducing fear, whilst formal surveillance through police or public transport 
employees is viewed more positively by passengers and has been proved effective; 
• and ‘soft measures’ such as public awareness campaigns and improved reporting 
mechanisms are highly valued by women. 
Masoumi and Fastenmeier (2016) in Germany identified knowledge gaps in public perceptions 
of security in public transport in relation to:  
“the role of the size of urban population; differences between racial, religious, and 
sexual minorities and the majority of citizens; possible dissimilarities between 
different regions and sub-cultures; and the influence of micro-scale built 
environment, for instance in case of rail and bus stations and the surroundings.”  
 
Such findings relate to a more fundamental concern identified in the research regarding 
the degree to which transport operators and service providers understand their customers and 
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non-customers and their perceptions/needs in relation to security (see Beecroft and Pangbourne 
2015b; Fyhri and Backer-Grøndahl 2012 and Roche-Cerasia et al 2013). 
Beecroft and Pangbourne (2015a and 2015b) identified further challenges in the 
passenger security domain associated with trends towards the blurring of boundaries between 
traditional collective and private transport modes. This process is being accelerated by the 
growing market for shared mobility services. It is linked to current and potential future services 
and practices such as car sharing and connected and autonomous vehicles and is facilitated by 
ICTs such as mobile platforms and associated social media (see Hensher 2017; Docherty et al 
2018; and Hannon et al 2016). Provision of such services generates a range of security 
questions associated with data integration and sharing (see Callegati et al 2016) as well as 
social and behavioural norms (see Merat et al 2017), which could be critical factors in the 
success of such services and the realisation of the MaaS business model. 
 
Findings (3): What technologies are expected to have the biggest impact on security 
of transport in the future? 
Before discussing the impacts of specific technologies it is important to acknowledge some 
general principles in the relationship between technology, transport and security. As Newton 
(2016) states: “The speed of change brought about by rapid developments in transport, 
combined with exponential advances of technology, result in a rapidly changing, dynamic and 
evolving landscape for transport-related crime opportunities.” Critically, Newton states: “crime 
design is often an afterthought of new technology, and rarely built in at the outset of invention 
and or innovation of new technology.” In this context, it is sensible to anticipate ‘crime waves’ 
to follow the introduction of transport technologies prior to reactive security measures being 
taken (Farrell et al 2011). This problem is predicted to be particularly acute in relation to cyber 
security threats to transport (TSC 2016). The criminal justice system also struggles to keep up 
16 
with the pace of transport technology change. The challenge is therefore to introduce security 
considerations proactively at the design and early implementation phases on technological 
innovations.  
When considering the relationship between transport technology and security it is 
important to remember that technology should not be used to replace people on grounds of 
security as people remain the most effective source of reassurance for passengers (Beecroft et 
al 2007; Delbosc and Currie 2012; Beecroft and Pangbourne 2015a, Carter et al 2016; 
McCarthy 2016a and 2016b; Newton 2016). This points to a significant danger when focussing 
upon technology in seeking to address transport security problems - the potential neglect of 
user needs, an example here might be the issue of target hardening increasing the severity of 
criminal activity e.g. biometric vehicle access may make the human being the target/weakest 
link in vehicle theft (Beecroft et al 2007). In considering how transport technologies influence 
crime opportunities Newton (2016) proposes five different interactions or impacts: 
1. Transport technology dependent crime (transport system is target of crime e.g. 
hijacking, vehicle theft, fare evasion) 
2. Transport technology as an enabler of crime (transport system as new arena for 
existing crime e.g. robbery, theft from person, assault,) 
3. Transport technology as an enhancer of crime (transport technology increases 
scale/extent of crime e.g. theft of personal data on Wi-Fi networks or from 
payment cards, use of vehicles in theft, terrorist acts on transport networks) 
4. Transport technology as a preventer of crime (transport technology reduces crime 
opportunities e.g. CCTV, scanning and access controls, cashless travel cards, 
ANPR) 
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5. Transport technology as an influence on perceptions of crime (transport 
technology positively influences travel perceptions and fear of crime e.g. real 
time information, help points, secure design, in-vehicle CCTV streaming) 
Taking Newton’s framework and drawing on wider evidence, a range of technologies 
that are likely to have the biggest impact on future security of transport are presented in Table 
1. These technologies are grouped into Vehicle and ICT categories. The technologies chosen 
can only be illustrative given the complexity and sheer proliferation of new technologies that 
must be anticipated. These technologies have also been chosen to illustrate the range of 
potential impacts and the fact that they can be both positive and negative (all five 
interactions/impacts from Newton’s framework are evident in both categories in Table 1). This 
dichotomy is key in highlighting risk and uncertainty which are critical issues when assessing 
potential impact. A significant casual factor of such uncertainty is that technology effects are 
not solely a consequence of what the technology is capable of but also of how it is used by 
people (Huber and Lyons 2013).  
Some technologies designed specifically as transport security technologies (e.g. blast 
resistant materials, scanning and access control including biometrics) are not included as the 
degree of risk and uncertainty associated with their impacts is likely to be comparatively small. 
This is not to say that transport security technologies do not have the potential to cause negative 
security impacts. McCarthy et al (2016a and 2016b) investigated the attitudes to and risks 
associated with linking security technology and social networking apps in the form of personal 
security apps (which turn a smartphone into a type of panic alarm). They found that: 
 “security technologies could also pose their own risks with regard to transport 
users’ privacy through the potential for data collection and storage. Transport, in 
particular, allows the data collector potential access to information on the users’ 
habits through the location information that could be collected during an 
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This review has considered an extensive range of evidence in seeking to address the three 
research questions. In relation to current and emerging challenges, the challenges are many and 
varied. When looking across the five themes in our public transport security typology the 
following priority challenges can be determined: 
 
What are the current security challenges for public transport networks? 
• How do we enhance the security of our public transport networks, services and 
infrastructure (learning from aviation) without significant impacts upon 
convenience and privacy? 
• How do we resolve interoperability and communication problems across our public 
transport systems to maximise the benefits of increasing connectivity? 
• How do we realise the benefits of increasing connectivity in our public transport 
systems whilst mitigating the risks? 
• How do ensure that the transport sector has the skills to mitigate the risks of a 
dynamic, complex and increasingly connected operating environment? 
What are the emerging security challenges, looking out to 2040? 
• How do we ensure security for users and service providers in a future mobility 
system which is data driven? 
• How do we establish principles of systematic design and evaluation of security 
measures for all modes? 
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• Is transparency, knowledge-exchange and coordination achievable in research and 
action across mobility sectors to enhance security? 
• How can we better understand people’s behaviour, needs and attitudes in relation 
to travel, technology and security?  
In relation to research question 3 the following key findings have been identified: 
What technologies are expected to have the biggest impact on security of transport in 
the future? 
Before assessing impact we need to recognise that the pace of change in transport and 
technology results in a rapidly changing, dynamic and evolving landscape for public transport-
related crime. Crime prevention is often an afterthought of new technology design and so crime 
waves can often follow the introduction of transport technologies prior to reactive security 
measures being taken. Technology should not replace people on grounds of security as people 
remain the most effective source of reassurance for passengers. 
The biggest impact technologies are grouped into categories of Vehicle (Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles; Connected and Autonomous Vehicles and Electric Vehicles) and ICT (Internet 
of Things; social media; mobile platforms; Open Data, Big Data and 3DP). These technologies 
illustrate a wide range of potential impacts both positive and negative. This dichotomy is key 
in highlighting risk and uncertainty which are critical issues when assessing potential impact. 
In relation to ICTs, the biggest impacts relate to connectivity and data sharing and these 
represent both vulnerabilities and strengths. In relation to vehicle technologies, automation and 
connectivity are the factors most influencing impact for good or ill. 
This review of security and future mobility has contributed to scholarly knowledge by 
highlighting significant current, emerging and potential future challenges. Lack of data and 
data reliability have been identified as common problems in the field of transport crime and 
security. Technology may address some of the technical data challenges, but the human 
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dimension around reporting crime is a more difficult issue.  Developing a more proactive, 
anticipatory approach to threats and challenges is critical and will require action across all three 
fields of public transport, security and technology. It will also depend upon better 
understanding the interfaces between these three fields. This understanding requires changes 
in managerial practice to improve communication between public transport stakeholders across 
these three fields and an associated collective recognition of their interdependence. This 
recognition must precede, not follow security challenges if a more secure future for mobility is 
to be achieved. 
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UAV surveillance for 
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Table 1 New transport technologies and their potential security impacts. 
 
